Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but recipients often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We study a model of competitive information disclosure by two senders, in which the receiver may garble each sender's experiment, subject to a cost increasing in the informativeness of the garbling. As long as attention costs are not too low, there is an interval of prior means over which it is an equilibrium for both senders to offer full information, which interval expands as attention costs grow. Information on one sender substitutes for information on the other, which allows the receiver to nullify the profitability of a deviation. We thus provide a novel channel through which competition encourages information disclosure.
Introduction
The standard Bayesian persuasion framework allows senders to design arbitrarily informative signal structures, and assumes that receivers costlessly process all information made available to them. This is an unrealistic assumption in many natural contexts, in which agents may rationally choose to stay partly ignorant. Moreover, there are many situations in which multiple senders compete via information provision to be chosen by the agent. In this competitive scenario, we ask how the consumer's information-processing, or attention, costs shape the information provided by the senders.
Consider, for instance, the situation encountered by doctors. Patients rely on their doctors to make important medical decisions for them, such as the decision of which medication to take. Very often, multiple drugs exist to treat the same condition, but nevertheless differ in subtle ways that can prove crucial for patients. Which alternative is best might depend on the particular circumstances of individual patients; eg., someone's medical history might make him more prone to the side effects of one of them.
A well intentioned doctor has her task clearly cut out-she should study all primary research published on each drug, and let that information guide her prescription decisions. This means that when she reads about a clinical trial, she should dig into details such as whether, for instance, adverse side effects had led many trial subjects of a certain demographic group to drop out midway, or whether the drug had a differential impact depending on the stage of the illness.
However, getting detailed information involves substantial time and effort, and doctors typically find it difficult to keep up. Tellingly, Alper et al. (2004) find that it would take a doctor six hundred hours to skim all research relevant to general practice that is published in just one month. Consequently, they might pay attention only to some published summary statistics.
Pharmaceutical companies are prohibited from falsifying facts when marketing to doctors. They do, however, strategically decide how much information to reveal and in what form, and in doing so, take into consideration the lack of attention on the part of the recipients: designing pamphlets in a way that the most favorable pieces of evidence stand out, or other strategies of that ilk. As Goldacre (2014) explains, "They (doctors) need good quality information, but they need it, crucially, under their noses. The problem of the modern world is not information poverty, but information overload...So doctors will not be going through every trial, about every treatment relevant to their field...They will take shortcuts, and these shortcuts can be exploited [emphasis added]."
Motivated by this setting, we study a model of information disclosure á la Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) , with two senders, and a receiver who can save on attention costs by adopting a less informative experiment than what is chosen by the senders. The question we are interested in is how, and to what extent, the degree of attention costs matters for the relationship between competition and information disclosure.
More specifically, our model has two senders who simultaneously commit to a Blackwell experiment for the quality of their respective products, which are ex-ante identical. A receiver, who wishes to choose the sender with a higher quality, visits the senders sequentially. When she visits the first one, she observes the distribution of beliefs induced by his (the sender's) experiment, and is free to choose any mean preserving contraction, or garbling, of that. Think back to the doctor example, and the shortcuts she might take: she might read just the first few pages of an article, only the nontechnical parts, only the technical sections, or even just the title. All of these correspond to different levels of information, and all of these impose on the receiver different costs-a grueling slog through a complicated model takes more out of the receiver than does a quick skim of the conversational portions.
We capture this relationship by imposing that the more the receiver garbles (and hence the less information she acquires), the lower her attention costs are. Intuitively, it is less costly to draw from a distribution that is more concentrated around the prior, and hence involves less learning about the state. She faces a clear trade-off, since a garbling corresponds to a less informative experiment, and is less valuable for her decision problem (Blackwell 1951 (Blackwell , 1953 .
After taking a draw from her chosen garbling at the first sender, the receiver forms a posterior belief about that sender before deciding whether to visit the second sender. Importantly, we do not impose that the receiver must visit the second sender in order to choose him. As we show later on, this allows for the realistic scenario in which a receiver will have "seen enough" at the first sender and need not visit the second sender: her belief about the first sender may be so high that she chooses him without ever visiting the second, and it may be so low that she chooses the second, sight unseen. If she does decide to visit the second sender, the protocol is identical to that for the first sender: she chooses a garbling of his chosen experiment subject to an information cost. Finally, she chooses the sender favored by her posterior beliefs. Each sender wants to maximize the probability of being chosen.
Since the receiver's decision to choose a less informative signal than is being offered is the result of an optimization problem that accounts for attention costs, she is rationally inattentive.
1 The particular framework of rational inattention that we adopt is the same as in Lipnowski et al. (2019) and Wei (2018) . The former paper considers the problem of a principal whose preferences over actions are perfectly aligned with those of an agent. Attention costs are borne only by the agent, and the authors establish conditions under which the principal would want to restrict her information with a view to manipulating her attention. Wei (2018), like us, considers a binary types, binary action model with a single sender who has state independent preferences, and an exogenous threshold of acceptance for the receiver. He shows that it is always optimal for the principal to design a strictly less informative experiment than what would be chosen by the agent himself, if offered full information.
In contrast, we show that if two senders compete, then as long as attention costs are not too low, there is an interior interval of prior means over which it is an equilibrium for both senders to offer full information. Moreover, the interval expands as attention costs grow, and approaches the full range as they explode.
Intuitively, this happens because when choosing between two alternatives, information on the quality of one of them substitutes, to an extent, for information on the quality of the other. For instance, learning that one drug is of very poor quality is useful for the decision of a doctor, even if she learns nothing about the quality of the other. Furthermore, because of attention costs, the receiver obtains less information on each sender than is being offered. Then starting from a situation of full disclosure, if a sender deviates to provide less information than the receiver would obtain on path, she can compensate for it by using some of the 'surplus' information on the other sender. For values of the prior where we obtain the full information equilibrium, this happens in a way that she maintains the probability of making a correct choice, and the deviating sender does not gain.
Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to look at competitive information design with information processing costs faced by the receiver.
This relates thematically to several strands of the literature. One of them is competitive information design without any attention costs. With two senders, this has been studied (albeit with slightly different timing than what we consider) by Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015) , who identify the unique equilibrium. Hulko and Whitmeyer (2018) extend this analysis to n > 2 senders, while also incorporating the possibility of search frictions. Crucially, providing full information is not an equilibrium with zero attention costs, and we show that this continues to hold for positive but small attention costs.
Some other papers in that literature that bear mentioning are Au and Kawai (2017a,b) , Albrecht (2017) , Boleslavsky and Cotton (2018) and Board and Lu (2018) . The result that competition encourages information disclosure is familiar from some of these, but introducing attention costs offers a novel perspective on why that might be true. In short, with attention costs deviations are no longer profitable: in the receiver's subsequent search problem, she only ever learns from one sender and should one sender deviate and be less forthcoming, she simply chooses to learn from the other.
Our work is also related to the small but growing literature on persuasion of a rationally inattentive receiver by a single sender. The Introduction discusses the models of Wei (2018) and Lipnowski et al. (2019) . Bloedel and Segal (2018) take a different approach to a similar problem. In their framework, after observing the sender's experiment, but before seeing its realization, the receiver can choose a mapping from signal realizations to distributions over 'perceptions', incurring an entropy reduction cost. Then, the receiver observes the realized perception, and not the actual signal realization. As Lipnowski et al. (2019) explain, this is conceptually different from our paper (and theirs), since the receiver in our model pays a cost to reduce uncertainty about the state, and not the sender's message. Matyskova (2018) studies a persuasion model where the receiver, after observing the realization from the sender's signal, can acquire additional information on the state at a cost proportional to the reduction in entropy.
On the other hand, a few papers look at what happens if costs are instead on the sender's side. Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014) look at optimal persuasion mechanisms when the sender pays higher costs (proportional to entropy reduction) of designing more informative experiments. Likewise, Treust and Tomala (2017) consider constraints on the sender's information transmission channel. The sender in their paper has n copies of identical persuasion problems, but is constrained to send only k < n messages, which are transmitted with exogenous noise. Interestingly, they find that the sender's payoff from the optimal solution is the concave closure of his payoff function, net of entropy reduction costs. Thus, these costs arise endogenously in their model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 presents results for the benchmark with a single sender. Section 5 presents the equilibrium analysis with two senders and spells out how the level of attention costs matters. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains proofs that are not presented in the main text.
Model
There are two senders indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}, and a receiver (R). Sender i has type ω i ∈ Ω i := {0, 1}, with the types being drawn independently. The common prior belief is that Pr(ω i = 1) = µ ∈ (0, 1) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
R has to select one of the two senders, and she has no outside option. 2 Her payoff is equal to the type of the selected sender, minus attention costs that we elaborate on below. Sender i's payoff is 1 if he is selected, and 0 if not. All players maximize expected payoffs. The game proceeds in the following 3 stages.
Stage 0: Each (ex-ante uninformed) sender simultaneously commits to a Blackwell experiment that generates information about his own type. Such an experiment is a mapping from {0, 1} to the set of Borel probability measures over a compact metric space of signal realizations. Each signal realization, then, is associated with a posterior belief distribution on {0, 1}, and an experiment induces a distribution over posterior beliefs. Hereafter, we identify a posterior belief with the belief on ω i = 1. From the work of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), we know that the set of Blackwell experiments is isomorphic to the set of distributions of posterior beliefs whose average is the prior. Thus, at this stage 0, sender i commits to a distribution p i ∈ ∆[0, 1], with [0, 1] x p i (dx) = µ.
Stage 1: R, who at this point does not observe the chosen distributions, decides whether to visit any sender, and if yes, which one.
Say she visits sender 1 first. Upon visiting she observes 1's distribution p 1 , and is free to choose any q 1 that is a mean preserving contraction (or garbling) of p 1 .
3 Associated with any such q 1 is a attention cost given by the following:
where k > 0. Associated with each posterior x is a cost k(x − µ) 2 , and the cost of a distribution of posteriors is its expectation under that distribution.
with the inequality strict for strict garblings. For instance, C(q) is minimized when q is the degenerate distribution δ µ , and maximized when it has support {0, 1}.
R takes a draw from q 1 , which determines her posterior belief about sender 1. She faces a trade-off in her choice of q 1 , because a garbling costs less, but also corresponds to a (Blackwell) less informative experiment and is less valuable for her decision problem. Note that the sender's chosen distribution p j determines R's choice set and, loosely speaking, puts a cap on how much she can learn. It does not, however, directly determine her attention cost.
Stage 2: R then decides whether to visit sender 2. If she does, she observes p 2 and chooses a garbling q 2 , once again incurring an attention cost C(q 2 ). She takes a draw from q 2 , which determines her posterior belief about this sender. Finally, she chooses the sender for whom her posterior belief is higher.
5 She need not have visited a sender or learned anything from him in order to select him.
Notice that R's optimal garbling at stage 2 potentially depends on the belief she draws at stage 1. She may be more or less inclined to learn about the second sender, depending on how much uncertainty has already been resolved about the first one. Indeed, as we shall see, if the stage 1 belief is close enough to 0 or 1, she chooses not to learn at all at stage 2, and this fact plays a crucial role in our analysis.
The distribution offered by the sender visited first dictates how much can be learned at stage 1. Then in light of the preceding observation, if both senders offer different distributions, the choice of whom to visit first (if anyone) matters for payoffs.
A pure strategy for sender i is a choice of a distribution p i ∈ ∆[0, 1] whose average is µ. A pure strategy for R consists of i) a choice of which sender to visit first, if any; ii) a choice of garbling for any distribution offered by the sender she visits first; iii) a choice of whether to visit the second sender for each belief drawn in the previous stage; iv) a choice of garbling for the second sender, for each distribution offered by him and each posterior belief drawn in the previous stage. Our solution concept is Subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies 6 (hereafter, equilibrium), defined in the standard way.
Before proceeding to our analysis, we point out the following characterization of the set of garblings of a binary distribution, which we shall extensively use:
q is a garbling of a distribution with
4 Benchmark: Single sender
We begin by taking a brief look at what happens if there is only a single sender. R chooses a garbling of that sender's distribution and accepts his product if the belief drawn from it is above a threshold λ ∈ (0, 1). If λ < µ, it is a trivial observation that any sender optimal distribution is such that nothing is learned and he is accepted with certainty. For example, he can simply design an uninformative experiment. Now say λ > µ. If k = 0, then we have a standard Bayesian persuasion problem, and we know from prior work that the sender's optimal distribution has support {0, λ}. If k > 0, this is no longer the optimal solution, because the garbling chosen by R in response to that would be δ µ , and the sender would not be accepted. This is easy to see intuitively-at a belief λ, R is indifferent between accepting and rejecting. When offered {0, λ}, her gross payoff from choosing any garbling is the same as the payoff from rejecting with certainty. But then there is no reason for her to pay a cost to acquire any information. To make it worth her while to do so, the sender would have to allow her to generate beliefs above λ.
Wei (2018) shows that the setup with a single sender permits two simplifications. 7 One, the sender's problem can be solved subject to an incentive compatibility constraint, which imposes that R should not want to garble the distribution offered. This leads to the second simplification, which is that it is without loss to restrict attention to binary and degenerate distributions. (Since R has only two actions, she never wants to pay to generate more than two beliefs.)
The following proposition summarizes the results for this benchmark case.
Proposition 1. Suppose there is a single sender, and R has a threshold of acceptance λ > µ.
Then,
1. An equilibrium exists.
2. In any equilibrium, the sender chooses a distribution that is strictly less informative (in the Blackwell sense) than the distribution the receiver would choose if offered full information.
Proof. See Wei (2018).
In response to full information, say R would choose the garbling with support {ν 1 , ν 2 } where ν 1 < λ < ν 2 . Then this result says that in equilibrium, the distribution offered by the sender would be a strict garbling of this. The intuition roughly is that although the sender cannot implement the first best solution {0, λ}, he can still restrict R's learning so that the higher belief in the support is below ν 2 , and the probability of its realization is higher.
As we see in the next section, introducing an additional sender yields an interesting comparison to this.
Equilibrium analysis with two senders
We now analyze the game described in Section 3, for an arbitrary k > 0 and µ ∈ (0, 1).
To start off, recall our observation that R's order of visits matters when the two distributions on offer are different. In equilibrium R must correctly anticipate the distributions chosen, and the order of visits must be a best response to those. However, since she does not observe the chosen distributions at stage 0, any deviation by a sender goes undetected until and unless he is visited. This has the following implication, which we note for further reference.
Remark. Any deviation by a sender cannot affect either R's decision to visit a sender, or the order of her visits.
Next, note that if both senders offer the same distribution, then R is indifferent between the two orders of visit (if she visits anyone). The analysis below will make it clear that the tie breaking rule in this case does not matter for our results, and we do not assume anything about it.
We now turn to the question of equilibrium existence. Suppose that each of the two senders offers no information, i.e the distribution δ µ . Then upon visiting either sender, R is also restricted to choosing δ µ . But then she expects to gain nothing by visiting a sender, and not visiting either of them is a best response. She may simply select sender 1 with any probability p ∈ [0, 1], and sender 2 with probability 1 − p. Clearly, if this best response is played, a deviation by a sender goes undetected, and does not make any difference to the outcome. Thus we have the following.
Claim 2 (Equilibrium existence). An equilibrium exists ∀µ ∈ (0, 1), k > 0. In particular, there is always an equilibrium in which each sender offers an uninformative distribution.
Naturally, we are interested in finding other, more interesting equilibria. As shown in Section 4, provision of full information is never an equilibrium with a single sender. The following Proposition, which states our main result, establishes that competitive forces indeed lead to such an equilibrium for some parameter values.
Proposition 3 (Full information equilibrium).
1. ∀k > 1/2, there is an equilibrium in which both senders offer full information iff µ ∈ [
2. ∀k ∈ (0, 1/2], µ ∈ (0, 1), there is no equilibrium in which both senders offer full information.
Note that this result does not imply that R ever chooses to learn a sender's type perfectly, and indeed the equilibrium existence result extends to any less informative distribution that still allows her to choose what she does when offered full information. , we obtain an interval of priors over which full information is an equilibrium, and this interval expands as k grows. In the limit, as k → ∞, the interval converges to (0, 1), the full range of priors. Thus, by having higher attention costs, the receiver might elicit better information from competing senders.
The following corollary states the same result differently.
Corollary 3.1. ∀µ ∈ (0, 1), there is an equilibrium in which both senders offer full information
Stated this way, one might conjecture that the result is trivially obtained because for high enough values of k, R finds it optimal to not learn anything at all even when offered full information. As it turns out, this is not the case, and for any finite k she does undertake some learning from at least one sender when offered full information.
Instead, we obtain the existence result because for high enough values of k, R finds it optimal to learn only about the quality of one sender, and completely ignore information on the other. The analysis ahead will elaborate on how this fact plays a crucial role.
Section 5.2 provides a proof of this result (and presents additional results), but before we move on to that, it is instructive to examine another benchmark, where k = 0.
Benchmark: No attention costs (k = 0)
When k = 0, it is costless for R to learn. This makes a significant difference to the analysis, because she never has a strict incentive to garble either sender's distribution.
9 It is only at stage 2 that she may garble, if the stage 1 draw is 0 or 1, since then her payoffs do not depend on the stage 2 draw. For simplicity, here we assume that i) if the stage 1 draw is 0 (or 1), she rejects (or accepts) that sender without visiting the other one, and ii) if the draws from both stages are the same, she selects the sender visited last.
Proposition 4 (No attention costs). Suppose k = 0. Then the following are true.
1. ∀µ ∈ (0, 1), there is an equilibrium in which both senders choose an uninformative distribution.
2. ∀µ ∈ (0, 1), there is no equilibrium in which both senders offer full information.
The reason an uninformative equilibrium exists is identical to that for k > 0-it is a best response for R to not visit either sender, but then a deviation is not detected and makes no difference to the outcome. The reasoning behind non-existence of a full information equilibrium, on the other hand, is very different for k = 0 and for small, positive k.
For k = 0, in response to full information from both senders, R visits either one of them, learns his type perfectly, and immediately takes a decision. A sender's deviation cannot make a difference if he is not visited first. But if he is, a deviation to support { , 1} is profitable, where is arbitrarily close to zero. This is because if R's draw from this distribution is , she continues to learn from the second sender, and rejects him if the draw then is 0.
When k is any positive quantity, a deviation of this nature does not help-intuitively, even if the stage 1 draw is a small, positive , R is sure enough of the quality of the first sender that she does not find it worth her while to learn about the other one.
The following result establishes existence of other (less than fully) informative equilibria when attention costs are absent.
Claim 5.
1. Let k = 0 and µ ≤ 1/2. There is an equilibrium in which each player chooses the uniform distribution on [0, 2µ].
2. Let k = 0 and µ > 1/2. There is an equilibrium in which each sender chooses a CDF with a continuous portion
and a point mass of size 2 − 1/µ on 1. In such an equilibrium, R's decision about whom to visit first must be fair (each sender is visited first with probability 1/2).
Positive attention costs (k > 0)
For positive attention costs, our main result pertains to the full information equilibrium, which is stated in Proposition 3 above. We begin by showing why it is true, and for ease of exposition present the key arguments for k = 1. The structure of the proof is the same for a generic k > 0, and the details are relegated to the Appendix.
Full information equilibrium for k = 1
Recall that for k = 1, Proposition 3 states that full information is an equilibrium if and only if µ ∈ [0.25, 0.75].
Start by considering any µ ∈ (0, 1), and suppose that each sender offers the distribution with support {0, 1}. To analyze R's best response, we proceed in two steps-first, we determine R's stage 2 best response for each belief drawn at stage 1; second, we use that to solve for the optimal stage 1 behavior. We make use of the technique of concavification for this.
R s stage 2 best response: First let us find the optimal stage 2 garbling, if R visits the sender at that stage.
Say the draw from Stage 1 is x ∈ [0, 1]. Then, R selects the second sender if and only if the stage 2 draw y turns out to be higher than x.
10 Her payoff from a stage 2 belief y is then max{x, y}, minus the attention cost associated with y. Denote this stage 2 payoff by
This is piecewise concave in y, and Figure 1 plots it for a representative value of x. Now, since any distribution is a garbling of the one with support {0, 1}, we know from Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) that for any given x, R's optimal garbling is determined using the concavification of U 2 (y; x) over [0, 1]. The concavification is the red curve in Figure  2 . It is evident that depending on where µ lies, the optimal distribution of beliefs is either degenerate on µ, or is binary. 
The interesting thing to note here is that regardless of the prior, if the first stage draw is either very high or very low, then R chooses not to learn anything from the second sender. This is intuitive-for a high enough belief that the first sender's quality is good, she deems it very unlikely that the second sender is better, and does not invest in learning about him. Instead, she accepts the first sender with certainty. Conversely, if the first stage draw is very low, she accepts the second sender with certainty.
Further, the thresholds beyond which there is no learning at stage 2 depend on the prior. The prior is the expected quality of the second sender, so the higher it is, the larger (smaller) the range of first stage beliefs over which the second sender is accepted (rejected) without learning.
If R does choose a binary distribution at stage 2, then she selects the second (first) sender at the higher (lower) belief.
For any stage 1 draw, if the stage 2 optimal garbling involves any learning, R strictly gains from visiting the second sender. If it does not involve any learning, R is indifferent between making the second visit and not, and she may resolve this in any manner.
R's stage 1 best response: Using the above result, it is straightforward to obtain R's first stage continuation payoffs for an arbitrary x, and determine her first stage optimal garbling from its concavification over [0, 1] . This leads to the following. 3. {0, y 1 (µ)} if µ < 0.25, where y 1 (µ) ∈ (µ, 0.25).
4. {y 2 (µ), 1} if µ > 0.75, where y 2 (µ) ∈ (0.75, µ).
The exact expressions for y 1 (µ) and y 2 (µ) are not important. The main thing to note here is that the stage 1 solution always involves some learning, and is unique if and only if µ ∈ [0.25, 0.75]. Interestingly, in spite of the fact that there are only two senders and binary types in this model, R may choose to generate more than two beliefs at stage 1. The reason is that each stage 1 belief is optimally followed by a different degree of learning at stage 2.
Note also that since the stage 1 optimal distribution always involves learning, a visit is necessarily made at this stage. R does not care which sender is visited first, and she may randomize her choice in any way.
Since there are multiple best responses for µ ∈ [0.25, 0.75], we need to make a selection among them. Notice that the most informative (in the Blackwell sense) of the optimal distributions has support {µ − 0.25, µ + 0.25}, and by Lemma 5.1, this is the only one among them that is necessarily followed by no learning at stage 2. We assume that R breaks her indifference in favor of this distribution. That is, when indifferent, she'd rather not put off learning until the next stage.
In summary: if µ ∈ [0.25, 0.75], R's best response to full information is the following. Visit sender 1 with probability q ∈ [0, 1], and Sender 2 with probability 1 − q. Choose the garbling with support {µ − 0.25, µ + 0.25} for the sender visited. If the belief drawn is µ − 0.25, select the other sender without learning anything from him.
11 If the belief drawn is µ + 0.25, select the visited sender without learning anything from the other one.
12
We now know what happens on path if full information is offered. For µ ∈ [0.25, 0.75], it turns out that we can rule out profitable deviations without exactly knowing R's best response to any deviation. For µ ∈ [0.25, 0.75], we show that there exists a profitable deviation for a sender.
No profitable deviation for µ ∈ [0.25, 0.75] : Consider what a sender achieves by deviating. We have already seen that this does not affect the probability of being the one to be visited first. Moreover, if he is not the one to be visited first, his payoffs are not affected, since R does not plan to learn anything from him. So, we only need to consider what happens if he deviates and is visited first. In this case, R's behavior would be altered if {µ − 0.25, µ + 0.25} is not a garbling of the distribution he deviates to. Now, say R visits a sender and finds out that she may no longer choose support {µ − 0.25, µ + 0.25}. Regardless of what the sender's deviation is, though, she is permitted to learn nothing, i.e choose support {µ}. By Lemma 5.2, this is one of her best responses, and by Lemma 5.1, this would be optimally followed by visiting the other sender (who has not deviated) and choosing support {µ − 0.25, µ + 0.25} for him.
11 Either by not visiting him at all, or by visiting but not learning. 12 ibid.
By responding to the deviation in this manner, R ensures a payoff equal to what is attained in the absence of the deviation. Naturally, any other response specified in Lemma 5.2, if permissible under the deviation, would also give her the same payoff, and she may choose that instead of support {µ}.
What this essentially implies is that in response to any deviation by the sender visited first, R would choose from the set specified in Lemma 5.2, and depending on the belief she draws, follow it with stage 2 behavior specified in Lemma 5.1.
This observation, and the next Lemma, are key to our analysis. This immediately implies that a unilateral deviation does not affect a sender's payoffs, and it is proven that full information is an equilibrium for µ ∈ [0.25, 0.75].
Let's take a closer look at the intuition behind this. In the best case scenario for R, i.e when both senders allow her perfect information, attention costs lead her to learn from only one sender. Now, if the sender from whom she does learn on path deviates and restricts her learning, she is able to compensate for it by learning more from the other sender. Such adjustment is possible only in the presence of attention costs, for it is only then that she has information on the other sender at hand, which she doesn't learn in the absence of the deviation. The ex-ante probability that she makes the correct choice thereby remains unaffected, and the deviating sender is unable to gain. This clearly highlights why having two senders instead of one leads to a full information equilibrium when the receiver is subject to attention costs. In particular, say for instance µ < 0.25. Recall that in response to full information, R chooses support {0, y 1 (µ)} at stage 1. Following belief 0 she immediately accepts the second sender, and following belief y 1 (µ), she chooses support {0, y 1 (µ)} at stage 2.
It can be shown that ∃p 2 ∈ (y 1 (µ), y 1 (µ)) such that if a sender deviates to {0, p 2 } and is visited second (by R holding a belief y 1 (µ) from stage 1), R chooses {0, p 2 } instead of {0, y 1 (µ)}. If he is instead visited first, R's best response is unchanged. Evidently this deviation increases the probability of being selected, and is therefore profitable.
Other equilibria for k > 0
The analysis so far tells us that for any k, first, an uninformative equilibrium always exists; and second, a full information equilibrium exists for parameter values where R's learning strategy has particular features. Where the full information equilibrium is obtained, it is natural to focus on it, since it must maximize R's welfare.
As shown in Appendix A.1, it never happens in this equilibrium that R herself chooses the fully informative distribution for any sender. In fact, in such an equilibrium she visits only one sender and picks support {µ − 
}.
It is then immediate that whenever full information is an equilibrium, there is a whole class of equilibria that allow R to behave exactly the same way, and are therefore welfare equivalent to it. ]. For i ∈ {0, 1}, let p i ∈ ∆[0, 1] be any distribution with expectation µ, and of which the distribution with support {µ − 1 4k
} is a garbling. Then, there is an equilibrium in which sender i offers the distribution p i .
The following can be obtained using this.
Corollary 6.1.
1. Let µ ≤ 1/2. Then there is an equilibrium in which both senders offer the uniform distribution on [0, 2µ] if k ≥ 1/(2µ).
2. Let µ > 1/2. Then there is an equilibrium in which both senders offer a CDF with a continuous portion F (x) = x/(2µ) on [0, 2(1 − µ)] and a point mass of size 2 − 1/µ on 1 if k ≥ 1/(2µ) for µ ≤ 2/3, and if k ≥ 1/(4(1 − µ)) for µ ≥ 2/3.
The particular distributions from the above corollary are of interest, because recall from Claim 5 that they are also equilibria in the k = 0 scenario, where full information is not an equilibrium. In contrast, here these equilibria are outcome equivalent to full information. The difference arises since with attention costs, both full information and these distributions are garbled down to the same thing by R.
In fact, for the class of symmetric binary distributions there is a sharp result that goes beyond Claim 6. Essentially, it tells us that if a symmetric binary equilibrium exists, so must the full information equilibrium, and in fact it must be outcome equivalent to the full information one. This reinforces our focus on a full information equilibrium.
Proposition 7. Let the distribution p have support {l, h} with l ∈ [0, µ) and h ∈ (µ, 1].
, it is an equilibrium for both senders to offer p iff µ ∈ [l + 1 4k
, it is not an equilibrium for both senders to offer p.
The proof uses arguments similar to those for the full information equilibrium. } is available to R. She gets to behave exactly as she would under full information, and we saw in Proposition 6 that this gives us an equilibrium.
Conclusion
We study a model of information disclosure by two senders who compete to persuade a receiver. The receiver, instead of passively accepting the experiment adopted by a sender, may choose to garble it. The more she garbles, the less informative the experiment she draws from, and the lower her attention costs are. We show how the amount of information disclosed depends on the degree of attention costs, and how this differs from the setting with a single sender.
We find that as long as attention costs are not too low, there is an interval of prior means over which it is an equilibrium for both senders to disclose full information. Further, the interval expands as attention costs grow, and approaches the full range in the limit. This is despite the fact that full disclosure is not an equilibrium either when there are two senders but no attention costs, or when there are attention costs but only one sender.
Our analysis provides clear intuition for the result. When the receiver faces a choice between two senders, her only aim is to determine who is better, and information on the quality of one of them serves as a partial substitute for information on the quality of the other. Now, when she faces attention costs, she chooses a strict garbling of each sender's experiment, and leaves some information unlearned. Then, starting from a situation of full disclosure, if one sender deviates and restricts her learning, she is able to compensate for it by using some of the surplus information at hand on the other sender. This allows her to maintain the overall quality of her information, so that the probability of making a correct choice between the two senders is unchanged, and the deviating sender does not gain.
We motivated our study with the example of pharmaceutical companies strategically disclosing information to prescribing physicians. The assumption of high attention costs, as well as a low outside option for the receiver are reasonable in this context. Our model, though a stylized one, provides an interesting insight into why more information on drug quality might be made available when there is more competition.
While we focus on this example, the model is well suited to study strategic disclosure in numerous other settings where information is 'complex', eg. the disclosure of features of retirement savings plans to consumers, or the informational content of political campaigns. 
A Proofs
Consider any k > 0 and µ ∈ (0, 1). Let each sender offer support {l, h}, with l ∈ [0, µ) and
We begin by proving a series of Lemmata.
Lemma A.1. Suppose that R's stage 1 draw is x ∈ [l, h] and she visits the sender at stage 2.
R's stage 2 optimal garbling is either degenerate or binary, and its support is as follows. }:
Proof. R's stage 2 payoffs for a stage 2 belief y are given by
This is piecewise concave. We first obtain the concavification of U 2 (y; x) over [l, h] and then use it to find the optimal garbling. The concavification of U 2 (y; x) is obtained by joining two points y 1 , y 2 (in a straight line) with l ≤ y 1 < x < y 2 ≤ h. By the definition of concavification of a function, we must have
with the first inequality holding with equality if y 1 > l and the second one holding with equality if y 2 < h. The solution to Inequation 1 with both equalities is
, the concavification is given by
}, the lower bound l binds and the concavification has y 1 = l.
is obtained from the second equality in Inequation 1.
}, the upper bound h binds and the concavification has y 2 = h.
is obtained from the first equality in Inequation 1.
14 The best way to see this is to assume it is does not hold and see that the definition of concavification is violated.
, the concavification is:
3. y 1 = l, y 2 = h otherwise.
Having obtained the concavification for any x, the optimal stage 2 garbling has support {y 1 , y 2 } if µ ∈ (y 1 , y 2 ), and support {µ} otherwise. Straightforward algebra then gives us the stated result.
}, R's optimal stage 1 garbling is (a) Any Bayes plausible distribution with support drawn from the set {µ −
}, R's optimal stage 1 garbling is: , R's stage 1 optimal garbling is:
(a) Any Bayes plausible distribution with support drawn from {µ −
(c) The distribution with support {y 2 (µ), h} with y 2 (µ)
, then R's optimal stage 1 garbling is unique and has binary support. Exactly one belief in the support is such that the optimal stage 2 garbling following it is {µ}.
Proof. Let U 1 (x) be R's first stage continuation payoffs for a first stage belief x. Say the stage 2 distribution following x has support {y 1 , y 2 }, with y 1 ≤ y 2 and νy 1 + (1 − ν)y 2 = µ.
is used to obtain the stage 1 optimal distribution. For any µ, U 1 is continuous. Note that U 1 is affine over any interval of x for which the stage 2 optimal garbling is {x −
Remark. If the stage 1 optimal garbling is unique, then it cannot have support {µ}.
The reason for this is the following. If the stage 1 unique optimal garbling is degenerate, then it is verified from Lemma A.1 that the stage 2 optimal garbling has binary support, say {y 1 , y 2 }. But then, choosing the garbling {y 1 , y 2 } at stage 1 and {µ} at stage 2 must give the same expected payoff, and hence must be optimal. This is a contradiction. . Clearly the lower bound l would bind and z 1 = l must hold. z 2 is obtained from the second equality in Inequation 1, and it must be higher than µ, since otherwise the optimal garbling would uniquely be degenerate, and we ruled that out above. , z 2 = h must hold. Now z 1 is found from the first equality in Inequation 1, and it must be lower than µ, since otherwise the stage 1 optimal garbling would uniquely be degenerate. z 1 is denoted by y 2 (µ) in the statement of the Lemma.
Cases 3 and 4 are dealt with completely analogously.
Finally, let k ≤ 0.5 h−l . Then U 1 is strictly convex in a right neighborhood of k(µ − l)
2 , and in a left neighborhood of h − k(h − µ) 2 , and strictly concave everywhere else.
The concavification therefore must:
2 in a straight line, and 2. join points
z 2 ≤ µ ≤ z 3 would imply that the unique optimal garbling is {µ}, and we know that cannot be the case. Thus, we must have either z 1 < µ < z 2 , in which case the optimal garbling is {z 1 , z 2 }, or z 3 < µ < z 4 , in which case it is {z 3 , z 4 }.
Further, it cannot be that
If that were the case, then Lemma A.1 would imply that the stage 2 distribution is necessarily {µ}, but then choosing {µ} must also be one of the optimal solution at stage 1, and that is a contradiction.
The previous result immediately gives us the following useful corollary.
Corollary A.2.1. The following two statements are equivalent:
2. There are multiple stage 1 optimal garblings for R, including support {µ} and support
. If R's behavior is as specified in Lemmata A.1 and A.2, then conditional on being the first sender to be visited, the probability of being selected is the same regardless of which stage 1 optimal garbling is chosen by R.
Proof. We show the proof for µ ≤ min{h − } and R's first stage response is a distribution
. Using Lemma A.1 it is easy to see that the probability of the first sender being selected conditional on a first stage belief x is given by
Suppose that F places a mass p ≥ 0 on µ − 0.25 k . Then conditional on being visited first, a sender's expected probability of being selected is given by
Next note that
and
Using Equations 3 and 4 in Equation 2, we get that V 1 = 0.5, which is independent of F .
A.1 Proof of Proposition 7
Suppose each sender offers support {l, h}, with l ∈ [0, µ) and h ∈ (µ, 1].
. Given a stage 1 draw x, R's optimal stage 2 garbling is specified in Lemma A.1. If this garbling does not have support {µ}, R necessarily visits the second sender. If it is {µ}, she is indifferent between visiting him and not, and may choose either way.
At stage 1, she has multiple best responses. The most informative one among them has support {µ − 
. Then from Lemmata A.2 and A.1, R chooses a unique binary garbling at stage 1, and exactly one belief in the support is followed by a visit to the second sender.
Denote the stage 1 belief following which R does learn at stage 2 by w. Under each possibility we show that there is a profitable deviation for a sender.
Possibility 1 : If w < µ, then deviating to support {l , h} is profitable, where l is such that
From Lemma A.1, if the deviating sender is visited second, R chooses support {µ} and selects the deviating sender with certainty. This does not affect R's behavior if the deviating sender is visited first, since l < w. Possibility 2 : If w > µ and is followed by a stage 2 best response {l +
, and Lemma A.1 tells us that if the deviating sender is visited at stage 2, R's response changes to {l, h }. w < h < l + w−l k implies that this is profitable if visited at stage 2, without affecting what happens if visited at stage 1.
Possibility 3 : If w > µ and is followed by a stage 2 best response of either {l, h} or {h − h−w k , h}. As discussed also by Wei (2018), an optimal solution exists for a single sender faced with a receiver with threshold of acceptance w. Here, it is seen that w < h, so that h does not bind at stage 1. This implies that a sender can increase or decrease h slightly without affecting what happens if he is visited first. Such a profitable deviation can always be found unless offering {l, h} is the optimal response for a single sender, given threshold w. It can be verified 15 that if indeed {l, h} is the optimal response for a single sender, then condition 1 is not satisfied for w.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
See the proof of Proposition 7, setting l = 0, h = 1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Existence of the uninformative equilibrium is proven in the text. Here we show non-existence of a full information equilibrium. Suppose that each sender chooses a fully informative distribution. Because each sender has chosen the same distribution (on path), R is indifferent as to whom she visits first. Hence, suppose that she visits sender 1 first with probability λ ∈ [0, 1] and sender 2 with its complement.
If sender 1 is visited first, then upon R's visit, 1 is realized with probability µ. At this point, she will stop and select sender 1. On the other hand, if 0 is realized then she will select sender 2 without visiting. The symmetric statements hold for sender 2 and her payoff is
Now suppose that sender 2 deviates and chooses a distribution that consists of 1 with probability η := µ − 1/n, n ∈ N, n > 1/µ, and with probability 1 + 1/n − µ, where := 1/(n + 1 − µn). If sender 1 is visited first then again sender 2 obtains an expected payoff of (1 − µ). If sender 2 is visited first, with probability η, 1 is realized and sender 2 is selected and with probability (1 − η), is realized. At this point R visits sender 1 and obtains a realization of 0 with probability 1 − µ, at which point she selects sender 2. Accordingly,
and so sender 2 has a profitable deviation if and only if
15 Details of the algebra are available on request.
which reduces to
Without loss of generality we may assume this, since otherwise the same argument would suffice for a deviation by sender 1. The limit of the left hand side goes to 1 as n goes to ∞; hence for any µ < 1 there exists an such that the left hand side is strictly greater than µ for all n >n. We conclude that for any µ < 1 there exists a profitable deviation, negating the possibility that full information is an equilibrium.
A.4 Proof of Claim 5
For µ ≤ 1 2 : Let each sender choose the uniform distribution on [0, 2µ], and suppose that R visits sender 1 first with probability λ ∈ [0, 1] and sender 2 with its complement.
No matter the realization at stage 1, R will proceed and visit the other sender as well before selecting one of them. Hence, u 1 = u 2 = 1/2. Next, we check for a profitable deviation. Suppose sender 1 deviates to a distribution that contains a probability measure of size a on [2µ, 1] and some portion F on [0, 2µ). It is clear that it is without loss of generality to set a to be a point mass on 2µ.
If sender 1 is visited first then with probability a, he is selected and sender 2 is never visited; and otherwise, sender 2 is visited after which R selects the sender with the highest realization. If sender 2 is visited first, then no matter what, sender 1 is also visited, after which the comparison ensues. Sender 1's payoff is u 1 = λ a + where G(y) = y/(2µ) is the (on-path) distribution chosen by sender 2 and where 2µ 0 dF = 1−a and 2µ 0 xdF = 2 − 2µa. Next, we use the result in Whitmeyer and Whitmeyer (2019) who establish that it suffices to show that 1 has no profitable deviation to any binary distribution. Let F be described by α with probability p and β with probability 1 − p; where 0 ≤ α ≤ µ, µ ≤ β ≤ 2µ, and αp + β(1 − p) = µ. Consequently, we rewrite u 1 , which becomes
Hence, there is no profitable deviation.
For µ > If sender 1 deviates to 1 with probability µ and 0 with probability 1 − µ, his payoff from deviating is
Since µ > 1/2, this is positive provided λ > 1/2 and negative provided λ < 1/2. Thus, if λ = 1/2 there exists a profitable deviation (if λ < 1/2, sender 2 can deviate profitably in the analogous fashion). It remains to show that this vector of distributions is an equilibrium for λ = 1/2. Substituting λ = 1/2 into u 1 , we see that u 1 = 1/2 on path. Just as for µ ≤ 1/2, from Whitmeyer and Whitmeyer (2019) we need check only deviations to binary distributions. Let F be described by α with probability p and β with probability 1 − p, where αp + β(1 − p) = µ and 0 ≤ α ≤ µ. There are two cases that we need to consider. 1. µ ≤ β ≤ 2(1 − µ); and 2. β = 1. In the first case, where we used the fact that β = 1 implies that 1 − p = µ − pα. Hence, there is no profitable deviation.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5.1
See the proof of Lemma A.1, setting l = 0, h = 1 and k = 1.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 5.2
See the proof of Lemma A.2, setting l = 0, h = 1 and k = 1.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 5.3
See the proof of Lemma A.3, setting l = 0, h = 1 and k = 1.
A.8 Proof of Claim 6
Let k > , 1 −
4k
]. As shown in Appendix A.1, one of R's best responses to full information (l = 0, h = 1) from both senders is to choose the garbling {µ − } is a garbling. Then, the aforementioned best response to full information is permissible, and thus continues to be a best response. Suppose R chooses this response.
Then if a sender unilaterally deviates and is the one to be visited first, R may respond by choosing {µ} and visiting the other sender, choosing {µ − } for him. Exactly as in the proof for existence of a full information equilibrium (Proposition 7 for h = 1, l = 0), Lemma A.3 can be used to argue that the deviation cannot be profitable.
A.9 Proof of Corollary 6.1 0 ≤ x < 2µ
It suffices to show that µ > 1/(4k), that j(x) − l(x) = 0 has at most one real root, and that j (µ + 1/(4k)) > l (µ + 1/(4k)). Set j(x) = l(x), which holds if and only if
This is imaginary if and only if k > 1 2µ
and has a unique root for k = 1/(2µ) (at µ). µ − 1/(4k) ≥ µ/2 > 0 for k ≥ 1/(2µ). It remains to verify that j (µ + 1/(4k)) > k (µ + 1/(4k)); but it is simple to verify that this must hold. Thus, if k ≥ 1/(2µ), we have the result.
For µ > 1 2 : The proof is analogous to the preceding one, with the exception that k must be sufficiently large so that µ + 1/(4k) ≤ 1. This holds if and only if k ≥ 1/(4(1 − µ)). This constraint binds for µ ≥ 2/3 and k ≥ 1/(2µ) binds for µ ≤ 2/3.
